

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA
CHARLESTON DIVISION

DEIDRE CULHANE, ON BEHALF OF)	
THE ESTATE OF DAVID CULHANE,)	
DECEASED)	MDL NO: 2873
)	
Plaintiff)	Master Docket No.: 218-mn-2873
)	
v.)	JUDGE RICHARD GERGEL
)	
THE 3M COMPANY, f/k/a MINNESOTA)	Civil Action No: 2:20-cv-2658-RMG
MINING AND MANUFACTURING CO.,)	
TYCO FIRE PRODUCTS, L.P.,)	COMPLAINT AND
SUCCESSOR IN INTEREST TO THE)	JURY DEMAND
ANSUL COMPANY, BUCKEYE FIRE)	
EQUIPMENT CO., CHEMGUARD,)	
NATIONAL FOAM, INC.,)	
E. I. DU PONT DE NEMOURS &)	
CO., THE CHEMOURS COMPANY,)	
L.L.C., ARKEMA, INC., DOWDUPONT, INC.,)	
KIDDE-FENWAL, INC.,)	
KIDDE, P.L.C., INC., UTC FIRE & SECURITY)	
AMERICAS CORPORATION, INC.,)	
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION,)	
CHUBB FIRE, LTD.,)	
ARCHROMA U.S., INC.,)	
)	
)	
Defendants.)	

COMPLAINT

Plaintiff, Deidre Culhane (“Plaintiff”), as executor of the Estate of David Culhane deceased (“Decedent”), by and through the undersigned counsel, alleges upon information and belief, as follows:

NATURE OF THE ACTION

1. Aqueous Film Forming Foam (“AFFF ”) is a specialized substance designed to extinguish petroleum-based fires. It has been used for decades, and continues to be used, by

military, county, and municipal firefighters to put out fires and in training and response exercises in preparation for fires.

2. AFFF contains synthetic, toxic per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances collectively known as “PFAS.”¹ PFAS bind to proteins in the blood of animals and humans exposed to such materials and not only remain and persist over long periods of time, but, due to their unique chemical structure, accumulate and build up in the blood/body of the exposed individuals with each additional exposure, no matter how small. PFAS can travel long distances, move through soil, seep into groundwater, or be carried through air.

3. Defendants collectively designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold and/or otherwise handled and/or used AFFF with knowledge that it contained highly toxic and long lasting PFASs, which would contaminate Decedent’s blood and/or body with PFAS, and the resultant biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in the blood and/or body of Decedent.

4. As a result, Decedent was exposed to AFFF containing PFAS and suffered severe personal injuries, and death, as a result.

5. This action is brought by Plaintiff for injunctive, equitable, and declaratory relief for injuries arising from the intentional, knowing, reckless and/or negligent acts and/or omissions of Defendants in connection with contamination of the blood and/or body of Decedent with PFAS

¹ “PFAS” includes but is not limited to: perfluorooctanoic acid (“PFOA”) and perfluorooctane sulfonic acid (“PFOS”) and related chemicals, including but not limited to those that degrade to PFOA and/or PFOS, and including but not limited to C3-C-15 PFAS chemicals, such as perfluorohexanesulfonate (PFHxS), perfluorononanoate (PFNA), perfluorobutanesulfonate (PFBS), perfluorohexanoate (PFHxA), perfluoroheptanoate (PFHpA), perfluoroundecanoate (PFUnA), perfluorododecanoate (PFDoA), HFPA Dimer Acid (CAS # 13252 -13- 6/C3 Dimer Acid/P-08-508/FRD903/GX903/C3DA/GenX), and HFPA Dimer Acid Ammonium Salt (CAS#62037-80-3/ammonium salt of C3 Dimer Acid/P-08-509/FRD902/GX903/GenX)

through the design, marketing, development, manufacture, distribution, release, training, and sale of AFFF containing PFAS.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

6. This Court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of this Complaint, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1332(a), as the parties are completely diverse in citizenship and the amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000.

7. Venue is proper in this District pursuant to this Court's CMO 3. Plaintiff states that but for the Order permitting direct filing in the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, Plaintiff would have filed this Complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas. Further, in accordance with CMO 3, Plaintiff hereby designates the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas as the "Home Venue" as this case may have originally been filed there. Venue is proper in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because it is the judicial district in which Decedent was a resident and citizen, a substantial part of events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred, and Defendants conduct business within this district.

PARTIES

8. Deidre Culhane, the Decedent's spouse, is a resident and citizen of Tucson, Arizona. She is properly situated to these bring claims pursuant to Texas law.

9. David Culhane, an individual, was a resident and citizen of Carrollton, Texas at the time of his death.

10. Defendant, 3M Company, f/k/a Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Company, ("3M"), is a Delaware corporation and does business throughout the United States, including conducting business in Texas. 3M has its principal place of business at 3M Center, St. Paul,

Minnesota 55133.

11. 3M designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold and/or otherwise handled and/or used AFFF containing PFAS that are used in firefighting training and response exercises which are the subject of this Complaint, including in Texas, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Decedent's blood and/or body with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in his blood and/or body.

12. Defendant Tyco Fire Products, L.P., successor in interest to The Ansul Company ("Tyco"), is a Delaware corporation and does business throughout the United States, including conducting business in Texas. Tyco has its principal place of business at One Stanton Street, Marinette, Wisconsin 54143. Tyco manufactured and currently manufactures the Ansul brand of products, including Ansul brand AFFF containing PFAS.

13. Tyco is the successor in interest to the corporation formerly known as The Ansul Company ("Ansul"). At all times relevant, Tyco/Ansul designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold and/or otherwise handled and/or used AFFF containing PFAS that are used in firefighting training and response exercises which are the subject of this Complaint, including in Texas, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Decedent's blood and/or body with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in his blood and/or body.

14. Defendant Buckeye Fire Equipment Company ("Buckeye") is a North Carolina corporation and does business throughout the United States, including conducting business in Texas. Buckeye has its principal place of business at 110 Kings Road, Mountain, North Carolina 28086.

15. Buckeye designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold and/or otherwise handled and/or used AFFF containing PFAS that are used in firefighting training and response exercises which are the subject of this Complaint, including in Texas, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Decedent's blood and/or body with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in his blood and/or body.

16. Defendant Chemguard is a Wisconsin corporation and does business throughout the United States, including conducting business in Texas. Chemguard has its principal place of business at One Stanton Street, Marinette, Wisconsin 54143.

17. Chemguard designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold and/or otherwise handled and/or used AFFF containing PFAS that are used in firefighting training and response exercises which are the subject of this Complaint, including in Texas, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Decedent's blood and/or body with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in his blood and/or body.

18. Defendant National Foam, Inc. ("National Foam") is a Delaware corporation and does business throughout the United States, including conducting business in Texas. National Foam has its principal place of business at 350 East Union Street, West Chester, Pennsylvania 19382.

19. National Foam designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold and/or otherwise handled and/or used AFFF containing PFAS that are used in firefighting training and response exercises which are the subject of this Complaint, including in Texas, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Decedent's

blood and/or body with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in his blood and/or body.

20. Defendant, E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. (“DuPont”), is a Delaware corporation and does business throughout the United States, including conducting business in Texas. DuPont has its principal place of business at 1007 Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware 19898.

21. DuPont designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold, and/or otherwise handled and/or used AFFF containing PFAS that are the subject of this Complaint, including in Texas, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Decedent’s and/or body with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in his blood and/or body.

22. Defendant, The Chemours Company, L.L.C. (“Chemours”), is a Delaware corporation and does business throughout the United States, including conducting business in Texas. Chemours has its principal place of business 1007 Market Street, Wilmington, Delaware 19898.

23. Chemours designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold, and/or otherwise handled and/or used AFFF containing PFAS that are the subject of this Complaint, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Decedent’s blood and/or body with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in his blood and/or body.

24. Defendant, Arkema, Inc., is a Pennsylvania corporation and does business throughout the United States, including conducting business in Texas. Arkema, Inc. has its principal place of business at 900 1st Avenue, King of Prussia, Pennsylvania 19406.

25. Arkema, Inc., designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released,

trained users, produced instructional materials, sold, and/or otherwise handled and/or used AFFF containing PFAS that are the subject of this Complaint, including in Texas, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Decedent's blood and/or body with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in his blood and/or body.

26. Defendant, DowDuPont, Inc. ("DowDuPont"), is a Delaware corporation and does business throughout the United States, including conducting business in Texas. DowDuPont, has its principal place of business at 974 Centre Road, Wilmington, Delaware 19805 and 2211 H.H. Dow Way, Midland, Michigan 48674.

27. DowDuPont designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold, and/or otherwise handled and/or used AFFF containing PFAS that are the subject of this Complaint, including in Texas, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Decedent's blood and/or body with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in his blood and/or body.

28. Defendant Kidde-Fenwal, Inc. ("Kidde-Fenwal") is a corporation organized under the laws of the State of Delaware and does business throughout the United States, including conducting business in Texas. Kidde-Fenwal has its principal place of business at One Financial Plaza, Hartford, Connecticut 06101. Kidde-Fenwal is the successor-in-interest to Kidde Fire Fighting, Inc. (f/k/a Chubb National Foam, Inc. f/k/a National Foam System, Inc.) (collectively, "Kidde/Kidde Fire").

29. Kidde-Fenwal designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold, and/or otherwise handled and/or used AFFF containing PFAS that are the subject of this Complaint, including in Texas, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Decedent's blood and/or body with PFAS, and the biopersistence

and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in his blood and/or body.

30. Defendant Kidde P.L.C., Inc. (“Kidde P.L.C.”) is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, and does business throughout the United States, including conducting business in Texas. Kidde P.L.C. has its principal place of business at One Carrier Place, Farmington, Connecticut 06034. Upon information and belief, Kidde PLC was formerly known as Williams Holdings, Inc. and/or Williams US, Inc.

31. Kidde P.L.C. designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold, and/or otherwise handled and/or used AFFF containing PFAS that are the subject of this Complaint, including in Texas, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Decedent’s blood and/or body with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in his blood and/or body.

32. Defendant UTC Fire & Security Americas Corporation, Inc. (f/k/a GE Interlogix, Inc.) (“UTC”) is a North Carolina corporation and does business throughout the United States, including conducting business in Texas. UTC has principal place of business at 3211 Progress Drive, Lincolnton, North Carolina 28092. Upon information and belief, Kidde-Fenwal, Inc. is part of the UTC Climate Control & Security unit of United Technologies Corporation.

33. UTC designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold, and/or otherwise handled and/or used AFFF containing PFAS that are the subject of this Complaint, including in Texas, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Decedent’s blood and/or body with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in his blood and/or body.

34. Defendant United Technologies Corporation (“United Technologies”) is a foreign corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Delaware, and does business

throughout the United States, including conducting business in Texas. United Technologies has its principal place of business at 8 Farm Springs Road, Farmington, Connecticut 06032.

35. United Technologies designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold, and/or otherwise handled and/or used AFFF containing PFAS that are the subject of this Complaint, including in Texas, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Decedent's blood and/or body with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in his blood and/or body.

36. Defendant Chubb Fire, Ltd. ("Chubb") is a foreign private limited company, with offices at Littleton Road, Ashford, Middlesex, United Kingdom TW15 1TZ. Upon information and belief, Chubb is registered in the United Kingdom with a registered number of 134210. Upon information and belief, Chubb is or has been composed of different subsidiaries and/or divisions, including but not limited to, Chubb Fire & Security Ltd., Chubb Security, PLC, Red Hawk Fire & Security, LLC, and/or Chubb National Foam, Inc.

37. Chubb designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold, and/or otherwise handled and/or used AFFF containing PFAS that are the subject of this Complaint, including in Texas, in such a way as to result in the contamination of Decedent's blood and/or body with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in his blood and/or body.

38. When reference is made in this Complaint to any act or omission of any of the Defendants, it shall be deemed that the officers, directors, agents, employees, or representatives of the Defendants committed or authorized such act or omission, or failed to adequately supervise or properly control or direct their employees while engaged in the management, direction, operation, or control of the affairs of Defendants, and did so while acting within the scope of their duties,

employment or agency.

39. The term “Defendant” or “Defendants” refers to all Defendants named herein jointly and severally.

GENERAL FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

40. AFFF is a mixture of chemicals, including PFAS, used to put out petroleum- based fuel and other flammable liquid fires. AFFF lowers surface tension of the fuel, which starves a fire of its oxygen supply. While the fluorinated compounds in AFFF work well to extinguish fires, they are not biodegradable. These toxic chemicals accumulate and contaminate the bodies of animals and humans who come in contact with or consume them.

41. Defendants designed, marketed, developed, manufactured, distributed, released, trained users, produced instructional materials, sold, and/or otherwise handled AFFF containing toxic PFAS that were used by entities around the country, including military bases, and county and municipal fire fighting departments. The City of Arlington Fire Department was one of the entities which used the foam for the abatement of chemical fires and training exercises.

42. Defendants have each designed, marketed, developed, distributed, sold, manufactured, released, trained users on, produced instructional materials for, and/or otherwise handled and/or used AFFF containing PFAS, including in Texas, in such a way as to cause the contamination of Decedent’s blood and/or body with PFAS, and the resultant biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in the blood and/or body of Decedent.

43. Prior to commercial development and large-scale manufacture and use of AFFF containing PFAS, no such PFAS had been found, detected, or were present in human blood.

44. By at least the end of the 1960s, animal toxicity testing performed by Defendants manufacturing and/or using PFAS indicated that exposure to such materials, including at least

PFOA, resulted in various adverse health effects among multiple species of laboratory animals, including toxic effects to the liver, testes, adrenals, and other organs and bodily systems.

45. By at least the end of the 1960s, additional research and testing performed by Defendants manufacturing and/or using PFAS indicated that such materials, including at least PFOA, because of their unique chemical structure, were resistant to environmental degradation and would persist in the environment essentially unaltered if allowed to enter the environment.

46. By at least the end of the 1970s, additional research and testing performed by Defendants manufacturing and/or using PFAS indicated that one or more such materials, including at least PFOA and PFOS, because of their unique chemical structure, would bind to proteins in the blood of animals and humans exposed to such materials where such materials would not only remain and persist over long periods of time but would accumulate and build up in the blood/body of the exposed individuals with each additional exposure, no matter how small.

47. Defendants manufacturing and/or using AFFF containing PFAS released such PFAS into the environment during, as a result of, or in connection with their manufacturing and other commercial operations, including into the air, surface waters, ground water, soils, landfills, and/or through their involvement and/or participation in the creation of consumer or other commercial products and materials and related training and response and instructional materials and activities, including in Texas, that Defendants knew, foresaw, and/or reasonably should have known and/or foreseen would expose Decedent to such PFAS.

48. By at least the end of the 1970s, Defendants manufacturing and/or using PFAS, including at least DuPont and 3M, were aware that PFAS, including at least PFOA and PFOS, had been detected not only in the blood of workers at PFAS manufacturing facilities, but in the blood of the general population of the United States in people not known to be working at or living near

PFAS manufacturing and/or use facilities, indicating to such Defendants that continued manufacture and use of such PFAS materials would inevitably result in continued and increased levels of PFAS getting into the environment and into human blood across the United States, even in areas nowhere near or associated with specific PFAS manufacturing or use facilities.

49. By at least the end of the 1980s, additional research and testing performed by Defendants manufacturing and/or using PFAS indicated that at least one such PFAS, PFOA, had caused Leydig cell (testicular) tumors in a chronic cancer study in rats, resulting in at least one such Defendant, DuPont, classifying such PFAS internally as a confirmed animal carcinogen and possible human carcinogen.

50. It was understood by Defendants by at least the end of the 1980s that a chemical that caused cancer in animal studies must be presumed to present a cancer risk to humans, unless the precise mechanism of action by which the tumors were caused was known and it was known that such mechanism of action would not be operative and/or occur in humans.

51. By at least the end of the 1980s, scientists had not determined the precise mechanism of action by which any PFAS caused tumors and thus prevailing scientific principles of carcinogenesis classification mandated that Defendants presume any such PFAS material that caused tumors in animal studies could present a potential cancer risk to exposed humans.

52. By at least the end of the 1980s, additional research and testing performed by Defendants manufacturing and/or using PFAS, including at least DuPont, indicated that elevated incidence of certain cancers and other adverse health effects, including elevated liver enzymes and birth defects, had been observed among workers exposed to such materials, including at least PFOA, but such data was not published, provided to governmental entities as required by law, or otherwise publicly disclosed at the time.

53. By at least the end of the 1980s, Defendants, including at least 3M and DuPont, understood that, not only did these PFAS, including at least PFOA and PFOS, get into and persist and accumulate in human blood and in the human body, but that once in the human body and blood, particularly the longer-chain PFAS, such as PFOS and PFOA, had a long half-life, meaning that they would take a very long time (years) before even half of the material would start to be eliminated (assuming no further exposures), which allowed increasing levels of the chemicals to build up and accumulate in the blood and/or body of exposed individuals over time, particularly if any level of exposures continued.

54. By at least the end of the 1990s, additional research and testing performed by Defendants manufacturing and/or using PFAS, including at least 3M and DuPont, indicated that at least one such PFAS, PFOA, had caused a triad of tumors (Leydig cell (testicular), liver, and pancreatic) in a second chronic cancer study in rats.

55. By at least the end of the 1990s, the precise mechanism(s) of action by which any PFAS caused each of the tumors found in animal studies had still not been identified, mandating that Defendants continue to presume that any such PFAS that caused such tumors in animal studies could present a potential cancer risk to exposed humans.

56. By at least 2010, additional research and testing performed by Defendants manufacturing and/or using PFAS, including at least 3M and DuPont, revealed multiple potential adverse health impacts among workers exposed to such PFAS, including at least PFOA, such as increased cancer incidence, hormone changes, lipid changes, and thyroid and liver impacts, which such Defendants' own scientists, lawyers, and advisors recommended be studied further to assess the extent to which PFAS exposures were causing those effects.

57. When the United States Environmental Protection Agency ("USEPA") and other

state and local public health agencies and officials first began learning of PFAS exposures in the United States and potential associated adverse health effects, Defendants repeatedly assured and represented to such entities and the public that such exposures presented no risk of harm and were of no legal, toxicological, or medical significance of any kind.

58. After USEPA and other entities began asking Defendants to stop manufacturing and/or using certain PFAS, Defendants began manufacturing and/or using and/or began making and/or using more of certain other and/or “new” PFAS, including PFAS materials with six or fewer carbons, such as GenX (collectively “Short-Chain PFAS”).

59. Defendants manufacturing and/or using Short-Chain PFAS, including at least DuPont and 3M, are aware that one or more such Short-Chain PFAS materials also have been found in human blood.

60. By at least the mid-2010s, Defendants, including at least DuPont and Chemours, were aware that at least one Short-Chain PFAS had been found to cause the same triad of tumors (Leydig (testicular), liver, and pancreatic) in a chronic rat cancer study as had been found in a chronic rat cancer study with a non-Short-Chain PFAS.

61. As of today’s date, the precise mechanism(s) of action by which any PFAS causes each of the tumors found in animal studies has(ve) not been identified, mandating that Defendants presume that any such PFAS that caused such tumors in animal studies be presumed to present a potential cancer risk to exposed humans.

62. Research and testing performed by and/or on behalf of Defendants making and/or using Short-Chain PFAS indicates that such Short-Chain PFAS materials present the same, similar, and/or additional risks to human health as had been found in research on other PFAS materials, including cancer risk.

63. Nevertheless, Defendants repeatedly assured and represented to governmental entities and the public (and continue to do so) that the presence of PFAS, including these Short-Chain PFAS, in human blood at the levels found within the United States presents no risk of harm and is of no legal, toxicological, or medical significance of any kind.

64. As of today's date, Defendants, through their membership in the FluoroCouncil, represent to the public through the FluoroCouncil website that: "The newer, short-chain chemistries currently in use are well studied [and] ... [t]he science supports the conclusion that the newer FluoroTechnology is not expected to present a significant risk to humans and the environment."

65. At all relevant times, Defendants, individually and/or collectively, have had the resources and ability but have intentionally, purposefully, recklessly, and/or negligently chosen not to fund or sponsor any study, investigation, testing, and/or other research of any kind of the nature Defendants claim is necessary to confirm and/or prove that the presence of any one and/or combination of PFAS in human blood causes any disease and/or adverse health impact of any kind in humans, presents any risk of harm to humans, and/or is of any legal, toxicological, or medical significance to humans, according to standards Defendants deem acceptable.

66. Even after an independent science panel, known as the "C8 Science Panel," publicly announced in the 2010s that human exposure to 0.05 parts per billion or more of one PFAS, PFOA, in drinking water for one year or more had "probable links" with certain human diseases, including kidney cancer, testicular cancer, ulcerative colitis, thyroid disease, preeclampsia, and medically-diagnosed high cholesterol, Defendants repeatedly assured and represented to governmental entities, their customers, and the public (and continue to do so) that the presence of PFAS in human blood at the levels found within the United States presents no risk

of harm and is of no legal, toxicological, or medical significance of any kind, and have represented to and assured such governmental entities, their customers, and the public (and continue to do so) that the work of the independent C8 Science Panel was inadequate to satisfy the standards of Defendants to prove such adverse effects upon and/or any risk to humans with respect to PFAS in human blood.

67. At all relevant times, Defendants shared and/or should have shared among themselves all relevant information relating to the presence, biopersistence, and bioaccumulation of PFAS in human blood and associated toxicological, epidemiological, and/or other adverse effects and/or risks.

68. As of the present date, blood serum testing and analysis by Defendants, independent scientific researchers, and/or government entities has confirmed that PFAS materials are clinically demonstrably present in approximately 99% of the current population of the United States.

69. There is no naturally-occurring “background,” normal, and/or acceptable level or rate of any PFAS in human blood, as all PFAS detected and/or present in human blood is present and/or detectable in such blood as a direct and proximate result of the acts and/or omissions of Defendants.

70. Data exists to indicate that the presence, accumulation, toxic invasion, and/or persistence of PFAS in human blood, including that of Decedent, is injurious and physically harmful and results in unwanted, unconsented-to, and deleterious alterations, changes, and/or other presently-existing physical injury and/or adverse impacts to the blood and/or body of Decedent, including but not limited to subcellular injuries, including but not limited to biopersistence and bioaccumulation within the body.

71. At all relevant times, Defendants, through their acts and/or omissions, controlled,

minimized, trivialized, manipulated, and/or otherwise influenced the information that was published in peer-review journals, released by any governmental entity, and/or otherwise made available to the public relating to PFAS in human blood and any alleged adverse impacts and/or risks associated therewith, effectively preventing Plaintiff from discovering the existence and extent of any injuries/harm as alleged herein.

72. At all relevant times, Defendants, through their acts and/or omissions, took steps to attack, challenge, discredit, and/or otherwise undermine any scientific studies, findings, statements, and/or other information that proposed, alleged, suggested, or even implied any potential adverse health effects or risks and/or any other fact of any legal, toxicological, or medical significance associated with the presence of PFAS in human blood.

73. At all relevant times, Defendants, through their acts and/or omissions, concealed and/or withheld information from their customers, governmental entities, and the public that would have properly and fully alerted Decedent to the legal, toxicological, medical, or other significance and/or risk from having any PFAS material in his blood.

74. At all relevant times, Defendants encouraged the continued and even further increased use and release into the environment of PFAS, including into Texas, by their customers and others, including but not limited to through manufacture, use, and release, of AFFF containing PFAS and/or emergency responder protection gear or equipment coated with materials made with or containing PFAS, and tried to encourage and foster the increased and further use of PFAS, including in Texas, in connection with as many products/uses/and applications as possible, despite knowledge of the toxicity, persistence, and bioaccumulation concerns associated with such activities.

75. Once governmental entities and regulators began learning of the potential toxicity,

persistence, and bioaccumulation concerns associated with PFAS, Defendants cited to the pervasive use of such PFAS throughout numerous sectors of the American economy (which they had intentionally and purposefully encouraged and created) and the widespread presence of PFAS in blood of Americans (which they also had negligently, recklessly, and/or intentionally caused) as an excuse and/or reason not to restrict or regulate PFAS, essentially arguing that the issues associated with PFAS had become “too big to regulate.”

76. To this day, Defendants deny that the presence of any PFAS in human blood, at any level, is an injury or presents any harm or risk of harm of any kind, or is otherwise of any legal, toxicological, or medical significance.

77. To this day, Defendants deny that any scientific study, research, testing, or other work of any kind has been performed that is sufficient to suggest to the public that the presence of any PFAS material in human blood, at any level, is of any legal, toxicological, medical, or other significance.

78. Defendants, to this day, affirmatively assert and represent to governmental entities, their customers, and the public that there is no evidence that any of the PFAS found in human blood across the United States causes any health impacts or is sufficient to generate an increased risk of future disease sufficient to warrant diagnostic medical testing, often referring to existing studies or data as including too few participants or too few cases or incidents of disease to draw any scientifically credible or statistically significant conclusions.

79. Defendants, to this day, use and rely upon what they claim is this same “lack of definitive evidence of causation” as between any PFAS and any adverse human health effect to oppose and try to discourage regulatory and/or legislative efforts to limit, restrict, and/or address PFAS impacts to the environment or human health, and to oppose, reject, and deny claims that

PFAS has caused any injury or increased the risk of any adverse human health effects.

80. Yet, to this day, Defendants knowingly, willfully, purposefully, intentionally, recklessly, and/or negligently refuse to fund or conduct any scientific study, research, testing, and/or other work of any kind that is extensive or comprehensive enough, according to Defendants, to generate results that Defendants will accept (outside the context of an existing written settlement agreement such as DuPont entered with respect to certain PFOA exposures, which created the C8 Science Panel) as sufficient to confirm a causal connection between any single or combination of PFAS in human blood and any injury, human disease, adverse human health impact, and/or a risk sufficient to warrant any personal injury compensation or future diagnostic medical testing, including medical monitoring.

81. Defendants were and/or should have been aware, knew and/or should have known, and/or foresaw or should have foreseen that their marketing, development, manufacture, distribution, release, training and response of users, production of instructional materials, sale and/or other handling and/or use of AFFF containing PFAS, including in Texas, would result in the contamination of the blood and/or body of Decedent with PFAS, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in his blood and/or body.

82. Defendants were and /or should have been aware, or knew and/or should have known, and/or foresaw or should have foreseen that allowing PFAS to contaminate the blood and/or body of Decedent would cause injury, irreparable harm, and/or unacceptable risk of such injury and/or irreparable harm to Plaintiff and Decedent

83. Defendants did not seek or obtain permission or consent from Decedent before engaging in such acts and/or omissions that caused, allowed, and/or otherwise resulted in Decedent's exposure to AFFF and the contamination of Decedent's blood and/or body with PFAS

materials, and resulting biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in his blood and/or body.

DECEDENT'S EXPOSURE TO AFFF

84. David Culhane served his community with quite a courage that is often taken for granted in first responders. For decades², when a citizen of Texas was enduring the most harrowing moments of their life, Mr. Culhane could be counted on to carry them to safety or preserve the remains of their personal property.

85. The City of Arlington Fire Department, like many fire departments around the country, used Defendants' AFFF foam in training exercises and live calls. As a valiant member of that Department, Decedent was exposed to toxic AFFF multiple times a year.

86. At the conclusion of his public service, Mr. Culhane hoped that he would have many years left in his life, to enjoy the company of his family.

87. Tragically, in approximately 2018, Mr. Culhane received a diagnosis from his physician, that he had Acute Myeloid Leukemia, though Mr. Culhane had no known family history of that condition.

88. Slowly and tortuously, Mr. Culhane was overcome by the disease. On July 18, 2018, he finally succumbed to the cancer and passed away in the presence of his family.

89. The last year of Mr. Culhane's life could best be described as a perilous struggle against a disease whose origin was still a mystery to his family and him. It remained a mystery until October 2019, when Plaintiff discovered information about AFFF being a human carcinogen.

90. Plaintiff took limited solace in discovering the cause of Mr. Culhane's untimely

² David Culhane worked for the City of Arlington Fire Department as a firefighter from 1979 to 2017.

demise.

91. As a trained and experienced firefighter, David Culhane knew every time his station received an emergency call, it could very well be his last. He was keenly aware of the risks of entering burning structures, climbing dangerous ladders, and navigating the hallways of unstable buildings. Mr. Culhane signed up to risk life and limb to protect his fellow citizens from being overtaken by fire and smoke. He did not sign up to risk it for the profits of Defendants’.

92. Defendants in this case knew the risks AFFF presented to the health of human beings. They knew that the users of PFAS containing AFFF would most often be those who take on the most sacred of public charges. But instead of informing the selfless public servants, giving them a chance to choose if the risk was worth the use, Defendants simply took that agency away from people like David Culhane.

93. Defendants believed that their bottom lines were more important than the health and lives of people like Mr. Culhane. They believed that their bottom lines were more important than the love and comfort that the rest of the Culhane family received from him. Defendants were wrong.

CAUSES OF ACTION

COUNT I **Negligence**

94. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if restated in full herein.

95. Defendants had a duty to exercise reasonable care in their design, engineering, manufacture, development, fabrication, testing, release, training and response of users, production of informational materials, handling, selling, use, and/or distribution of the inherently dangerous AFFF containing PFAS, including a duty of care to ensure that PFAS did not

infiltrate, persist in, and accumulate in the blood and/or body of Decedent.

96. Defendants owed a duty of care towards Decedent that was commensurate with the inherently dangerous, harmful, injurious, bio-persistent, environmentally-persistent, toxic, and bio-accumulative nature of PFAS.

97. Defendants failed to exercise ordinary care by acts and/or omissions that permitted, allowed, and/or otherwise resulted in the contamination of, persistence in, and accumulation in the blood and/or body of Decedent with one or more PFAS, including all such acts and/or omissions referenced in this Complaint, resulting in Decedent having one or more PFAS in his blood.

98. Defendants knew, foresaw, anticipated, and/or should have foreseen, anticipated, and/or known that the design, engineering, manufacture, fabrication, sale, release, training and response of users, production of informational materials, handling, use, and/or distribution of AFFF containing PFAS and/or other acts and/or omissions as described in this Complaint could likely result in the contamination of the blood and/or body of Decedent and its persistence and accumulation in his blood and/or body.

99. Despite knowing, anticipating, and/or foreseeing the bio-persistent, bio-accumulative, toxic, and/or otherwise harmful and/or injurious nature of AFFF containing PFAS, Defendants, their agents, servants, and/or employees, committed negligent acts and/or omissions that resulted in the contamination of the blood and/or body of the Decedent with one or more PFAS materials, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in his blood and/or body.

100. Defendants, through their acts and/or omissions as described in this Complaint, breached their duty to Decedent.

101. It was reasonably foreseeable to Defendants that Decedent would likely suffer the injuries and harm described in this Complaint by virtue of Defendants' breach of their duty and

failure to exercise ordinary care, as described herein.

102. But for Defendants' negligent and/or gross negligent acts and/or omissions, Decedent would not have been injured or harmed.

103. Defendants' negligent conduct was the direct and proximate cause of the injuries and harm to Decedent, as described herein.

104. Defendants knew it was substantially certain that their acts and omissions described herein would cause injury and damage, including contamination of the blood and/or body of Decedent and its persistence and accumulation in his blood and/or body. Defendants committed each of the above-described acts and omissions knowingly, willfully, and with oppression, fraud, and/or malice. Such conduct was performed to promote sales of AFFF, in conscious disregard to the probable dangerous consequences of that conduct and its reasonably foreseeable impacts on public health and welfare. Therefore, Plaintiff requests an award of punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish these Defendants and that fairly reflects the aggravating circumstances alleged herein.

COUNT II
Battery

105. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if restated in full herein.

106. At all relevant times, Defendants possessed knowledge that the AFFF containing PFAS which they designed, engineered, manufactured, fabricated, sold, handled, released, trained users on, produced instructional materials for, used, and/or distributed were bio-persistent, bio-accumulative, toxic, potentially carcinogenic, and/or otherwise harmful/injurious and that their continued manufacture, use, sale, handling, release, and distribution would result in Decedent having PFAS in his blood, and the biopersistence and bioaccumulation of such PFAS in his blood.

107. However, despite possessing such knowledge, Defendants knowingly, purposefully, and/or intentionally continued to engage in such acts and/or omissions, including but not limited to all such acts and/or omissions described in this Complaint, that continued to result in Decedent accumulating PFAS in his blood and/or body, and such PFAS persisting and accumulating in his blood and/or body.

108. Defendants did not seek or obtain permission or consent from Decedent to put or allow PFAS materials into his blood and/or body, or to persist in and/or accumulate in his blood and/or body.

109. Entry into, persistence in, and accumulation of such PFAS in Decedent's body and/or blood without permission or consent is an unlawful and harmful and/or offensive physical invasion and/or contact with Decedent's person and unreasonably interferes with Decedent's rightful use and possession of his blood and/or body.

110. At all relevant times, the PFAS present in the blood of Decedent originated from Defendants' acts and/or omissions.

111. Defendants continue to knowingly, intentionally, and/or purposefully engage in acts and/or omissions that result in the unlawful and unconsented-to physical invasion and/or contact with Decedent that resulted in persisting and accumulating levels of PFAS in his blood.

112. Decedent, and any reasonable person, would find the contact at issue harmful and/or offensive.

113. Defendants acted intentionally with the knowledge and/or belief that the contact, presence and/or invasion of PFAS with, onto and/or into Decedent's blood serum, including its persistence and accumulation in such serum, was substantially certain to result from those very acts and/or omissions.

114. Defendants' intentional acts and/or omissions resulted directly and/or indirectly in harmful contact with Decedent's blood and/or body.

115. The continued presence, persistence, and accumulation of PFAS in the blood and/or body of Decedent is offensive, unreasonable, and/or harmful, and thereby constitutes a battery.

116. The presence of PFAS in the blood and/or body of Decedent altered the structure and/or function of such blood and/or body parts and resulted in cancer and death.

117. As a direct and proximate result of the foregoing acts and omissions, Decedent suffered physical injury for which Defendants are therefore liable.

118. Defendants knew it was substantially certain that their acts and omissions described herein would cause injury and damage, including contamination of the blood and/or body of Decedent and its persistence and accumulation in his blood and/or body. Defendants committed each of the above-described acts and omissions knowingly, willfully, and with oppression, fraud, and/or malice. Such conduct was performed to promote sales of AFFF, in conscious disregard to the probable dangerous consequences of that conduct and its reasonably foreseeable impacts on public health and welfare. Therefore, Plaintiff requests an award of punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish these Defendants and that fairly reflects the aggravating circumstances alleged herein.

COUNT III
Inadequate Warning

119. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if restated in full herein.

120. Defendants knew or should have known: (a) exposure to AFFF containing PFAS was hazardous to the environment and to human health; (b) the manner in which they were designing, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling AFFF containing PFAS was

hazardous to human health; and (c) the manner in which they were manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling AFFF containing PFAS would result in the contamination of Decedent's blood and/or body as a result of exposure.

121. Defendants had a duty to warn of the hazards associated with AFFF containing PFAS entering and poisoning the blood and/or body of Decedent because they knew of the dangerous, hazardous, toxic, and poisonous properties of AFFF containing PFAS. Defendants failed to provide sufficient warning to purchasers that the use of their AFFF products would cause PFAS to be released into Decedent and cause the exposure and bioaccumulation of these toxic and poisonous chemicals in the blood and/or body of Decedent.

122. Adequate instructions and warnings on the AFFF containing PFAS could have reduced or avoided these foreseeable risks of harm and injury to Decedent. If Defendants provided adequate warnings: (a) Decedent could have and would have taken measures to avoid or lessen his exposure; and (b) end users and governments could have taken steps to reduce or prevent the release of PFASs into the blood and/or body of Decedent. Defendants' failure to warn was a direct and proximate cause of his injuries from PFAS that came from the use, storage, and disposal of AFFF containing PFAS. Crucially, Defendants' failure to provide adequate and sufficient warnings for the AFFF containing PFAS they manufactured, designed, marketed, distributed, and sold renders the AFFF a defective product.

123. Defendants were negligent in their failure to provide Decedent with adequate warnings or instruction that the use of their AFFF products would cause PFAS to be released into the blood and/or body of Decedent. As a result of Defendants' conduct and the resulting contamination, Decedent suffered severe personal injuries and death by exposure to AFFF containing PFAS.

124. Defendants' negligent failure to warn directly and proximately caused the harm to and damages suffered by Decedent.

125. Defendants knew it was substantially certain that their acts and omissions described herein would cause injury and damage, including contamination of the blood and/or body of Decedent and its persistence and accumulation in his blood and/or body. Defendants committed each of the above-described acts and omissions knowingly, willfully, and with oppression, fraud, and/or malice. Such conduct was performed to promote sales of AFFF, in conscious disregard to the probable dangerous consequences of that conduct and its reasonably foreseeable impacts on public health and welfare. Therefore, Plaintiff requests an award of punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish these Defendants and that fairly reflects the aggravating circumstances alleged herein.

COUNT IV
Design Defect

126. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if restated in full herein.

127. Defendants knew or should have known: (a) exposure to AFFF containing PFAS is hazardous to human health; (b) the manner in which AFFF containing PFAS was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold was hazardous to human health; and (c) the manner in which AFFF containing PFAS was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and could and would release PFAS into Decedent and cause the exposure and bioaccumulation of these toxic and poisonous chemicals in the blood and/or body of Decedent.

128. Knowing of the dangerous and hazardous properties of the AFFF containing PFAS, Defendants could have designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold alternative designs or formulations of AFFF that did not contain hazardous, toxic, and poisonous PFAS. These

alternative designs and formulations were already available, practical, and technologically feasible. The use of these alternative designs would have reduced or prevented the reasonably foreseeable harm to Decedent caused by the Defendants' manufacture, marketing, distribution, and sale of AFFF containing hazardous, toxic, and poisonous PFAS.

129. The AFFF containing PFAS that was designed, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by the Defendants was so hazardous, toxic, poisonous, and dangerous to human health that the act of designing, formulating, manufacturing, marketing, distributing, and selling this AFFF was unreasonably dangerous under the circumstances.

130. The AFFF designed, formulated, manufactured, marketed, distributed, and sold by Defendants was defectively designed and the foreseeable risk of harm could and would have been reduced or eliminated by the adoption of a reasonable alternative design that was not unreasonably dangerous. Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS was a direct and proximate cause of the contamination of the blood and/or body of Decedent and the persistence and accumulation of PFAS in his blood and/or body.

131. Defendants' defective design and formulation of AFFF containing PFAS caused the contamination described herein resulting in a personal injuries to Decedent. As a direct result of the harm and injury caused by Defendants' defective design and the contamination described herein, Decedent has been exposed to AFFF containing PFAS and other toxic substances and has developed cancer.

132. Defendants' negligent failure to design a reasonably safe product directly and proximately caused the harm to and damages suffered by Decedent.

133. Defendants knew it was substantially certain that their acts and omissions described herein would cause injury and damage, including contamination of the blood and/or body of

Decedent and its persistence and accumulation in his blood and/or body. Defendants committed each of the above-described acts and omissions knowingly, willfully, and with oppression, fraud, and/or malice. Such conduct was performed to promote sales of AFFF, in conscious disregard to the probable dangerous consequences of that conduct and its reasonably foreseeable impacts on public health and welfare. Therefore, Plaintiff requests an award of punitive damages in an amount sufficient to punish these Defendants and that fairly reflects the aggravating circumstances alleged herein.

COUNT V
Survival and Wrongful Death

134. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the preceding paragraphs of this complaint as if restated herein.

135. The acts and omissions of Defendants as plead herein were the proximate cause of Decedent's suffering and death.

136. The acts and omissions of Defendants as plead herein were likewise a substantial factor in the death of Decedent.

137. The acts and omissions of Defendants as plead herein caused substantial mental and physical pain and suffering by Decedent prior to his death.

138. The acts and omissions of Defendants plead herein which caused the death of Decedent caused his family to suffer his loss, who, without the conduct of Defendants, could have reasonably been expected to be alive for at least two more decades.

COUNT VI
Loss of Consortium

139. Plaintiff hereby incorporates by reference the allegations contained in the

preceding paragraphs of this Complaint as if restated in full herein.

140. Plaintiff is, and at all relevant times has been, the executor of Decedent's estate.

141. As a result of Defendant's fault, Decedent's heirs were and will continue to be deprived of the comfort and enjoyment of the services and society of Decedent, have suffered and will continue to suffer economic loss, and have otherwise been emotionally and economically injured. Their injuries are permanent and will continue into the future.

142. Therefore, Plaintiff asserts a cause of action for loss of consortium.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff requests the Court enter judgment against the Defendants on each of the above-referenced claims as follows:

- (a) Finding Defendants jointly, severally and solidarily liable for past, present and future damages suffered by Plaintiff and Decedent;
- (b) Awarding compensatory damages in excess of the jurisdictional amount, including, but not limited to pain, suffering, emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life, loss of life, and other non-economic damages in an amount to be determined at trial of this action;
- (c) Awarding economic damages in the form of medical expenses, out of pocket expenses, lost earnings and other economic damages in an amount to be determine at trial of this action;
- (d) Awarding punitive damages in an amount to be determined at trial;
- (e) Prejudgment interest;
- (f) Postjudgment interest;
- (g) Awarding Plaintiff reasonable attorneys' fees when applicable;
- (h) Awarding Plaintiff the costs of these proceedings; and
- (i) Such other and further relief as this Court deems just and proper.

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff hereby demands a trial by jury as to all issues.

Dated: July 17, 2020

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Robin Myers Primeau
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